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Abstract 
This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a two-country model with 
asymmetric shocks. Agents insure against risk through the exchange of Arrow-
Debreu securities. Although central banks commit to the policy that maximizes 
domestic welfare, this does not lead to price stability. In an attempt to improve 
their country's terms of trade of securities, central banks may choose an 
inilationary policy rule in good states. If both central banks do so, the effects on 
the terms of trade wash out, leaving both countries worse off. Countries facing 
asymmetric shocks may therefore gain from monetary cooperation. 
1 Introduction 
Mundell's theory of optimum currency areas has dominated the scholarly debate on mon-
etary unions since its publication forty years ago (Mundell, 1961). Its rule-of-thumb says 
that countries should keep separate currencies if they face asymmetric shocks and labor 
is immobile across borders. If one country is in a boom and the other in a recession, a 
common monetary policy is unable to react adequately. The failure of the euro zone to 
pass the Mundell test has led to widespread skepticism about the prospects of European 
Monetary Union (Eichengreen, 1997). 
However, a decade after his celebrated 1961 paper the same Mundell made a very 
different argument: countries experiencing asymmetric shocks could actually gain from 
adopting a common currency because of its beneficial effect on international risk sharing 
(Mundell, 1973). Recently, several authors have drawn attention to this "latter Mundell" 
(McKinnon, 2000, 2001; Ching and Devereux, 2000a, 2000b). They informally argue that 
if countries hold claims on each other's currencies to insure themselves against asyrnmetric 
shocks, central banks wiIl be tempted to inflate prices whenever those claims are redeemed. 
This may end up jeopardizing risk sharing, and it may be necessary to adopt a common 
currency to solve the problem. 
That the temptation to create surprise inflation may be self-defeating has been well 
known since the seminal work of Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). If agents understand the 
incentives of central banks, inflation ceases to come as a surprise, so that we end up with 
the worst of two worlds: incurring the cost of inflation without benefiting from its surprise 
effect. Only if central banks can credibly commit to a policy rule can we improve upon 
this outcome. In the absence of commitment problems, the optimal policy rule in Barro 
and Gordon (1983a,b) would prescribe zero inflation: since rational expectations render 
surprise inflation impossible, the best central banks can do is to maintain price stability. 
Applying this argument to our problem, we may think that credible commitment 
could do away with the temptation of creating inflation, thus ensuring the optimal solution 
without the need of adopting a common currency. Contrary to this intuition, our paper 
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suggests that credible commitment may not be enough. As we wiIl show, infiation may 
improve a country's terms of trade in the risk sharing market, so that the central bank 
may optimally commit to creating infiation. Of course, if both central banks try to distort 
relative security prices, their attempts faíl, leaving everyone worse off. This implies that 
the MundeIl (1973) argument in favor of monetary cooperation does not disappear when 
allowing for commitment a la Barro and Gordon (1983a,b). 
To understand the intuition behind this result, we briefiy layout the mechanics 
of the model. Consider two countries with perfectly negatively correlated supply shocks. 
llisk sharing happens through the exchange of nominal Arrow-Debreu securities. Countries 
have separate currencies ~d separate central banks. When deciding on the optimal level 
of infiation, central banks weigh off costs and benefits. On the one hand, infiation reduces 
welfare due to, for instance, menu costs or inefficient government spending. On the other 
hand, infiation - if it comes as a surprise - increases welfare because it lowers the real 
value of nominal payments to the other country. Allowing for rational expectations should 
do away with the benefits of infiation, since nominal contingent claims become equivalent 
to real,contingent claims. Surely in that case we would expect central banks to stick to 
price stability, as long as they have the capacity to commit. 
Not necessarily. There is a potentially important secondary effect which may over-
turn our previous argument: central banks can use infiation to affect the terms of trade 
of Arrow-Debreu securities. More particularly, central banks may commit to creating in-
fiation in states of nature in which their country is a supplier of securities. Since infiation 
lowers welfare, agents become less willing to supply securities, causing their price to go up. 
If the welfare gain from an inctease in the relative price is enough to compensate for the 
welfare loss from infiation, central banks will optimally choose to create infiation. 
Given the symmetric setup, both central banks follow this strategy. As a result, the 
corresponding non-cooperative Nash equilibrium leaves everyone worse off compared to the 
case of monetary stability: the positive effect on the terms of trade of contingent claims 
washes out, and we are left with the welfare cost of positive infiation. To reach the optimal 
outcome, sorne form of cooperation is therefore necessary. As is weIl known, cooperation 
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could be sustained in a repeated game framework without the need for an institutional or 
a formal arrangement. However, if for whatever reason this is not possible, a full-fledged 
monetary union with a common currency may well be the answer. This suggests that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, countries facing asymmetric shocks may stand to gain 
from adopting a common currency. 
Note that our model is related to the literature on monetary policy coordination (see 
Persson and Tabellini, 2000, for a survey and references). The standard textbook example 
is the case of competitive devaluations. In the wake of a negative demand shock, the central 
bank devalues the currency to improve the terms of trade: this stabilizes demand at the 
cost of higher inflation. However, if the country's trading partner also faces a negative 
demand shock, and reacts in the same way, the gain vanishes, while the welfare cost of 
higher inflation remains. These models of monetary policy coordination have a distinctly 
pre-rational expectations Keynesian flavor: a currency devaluation can only boost domestic 
demand if agents fail to foresee the future or if there are nominal rigidities. 
This is what makes our model different: individuals have rational expectations; 
monetary policy is announced in advancej and prices are flexible. Even though monetary 
policy loses its capacity to surprise, central banks may optimally commit to creating in-
flation in an attempt to improve their country's terms of trade in securities. The same 
mechanism has been studied in the context of fiscal policy by Celentani, Conde-Ruiz and 
Desmet (2002), where they show how voters may choose the level of government spending 
to manipulate the relative price of securities. 
2 Setup of the model 
Consider an infinite horizon model with two countries, A and B. Both countries produce 
the same freely transportable non-storable good. This rules out shocks to the relative 
price of exportables and asymmetric demand shocks.1 Time is discreteo In each perlod 
1 Shocks to the relative price of exportables are impossible because we are focusing on a single-good 
economy. Asymmetric demand shocks are excluded because openness acts as a complete automatic stabi-
Iizer. Consider, for instance, a negative consumption shock in A and a positive consumption shock of the 
same size in B. These shocks would simply be absorbed through the current account: in A the drop in 
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the economy's total production is 2. Although there is no aggregate uncertainty, countries 
are subject to perfectly correlated asymmetric supply shocks of size Q, where O < Q < 1. 
Which region gets the positive shock is uncertain, so that in each period there are two 
possible states of nature: in state s = 1 country A experiences a positive shock, and B 
a negative shock; in state s = 2 country B receives a positive shock, and A a negative 
shock. Focusing on the perfectly symmetric case, each state occurs with probability 1/2.2 
Country-level production in any given period is then: 
1 + Q if s = 1 (with probability 1/2) 
1 - Q if s = 2 (with probability 1/2) 
1 - Q if s = 1 (with probability 1/2) 
1 + Q if s = 2 (with probability 1/2) 
(1) 
(2) 
Each country is populated by a unit mass of homogeneous risk-averse agents. To 
keep the problem analytically tractable, we focus on CRRA prefeJ;ences, so that the period 
expected utilities of the representative agents can be written as: 
1 (CA)l-p 1 (CA)l-P U A = _ 1 + _ -,-2::....:.._ 
2 1-p 2 1-p (3) 
1 (CB)l-p 1 (CB)l-p U B = _ 1 + _ .>.-2,,-,-_ 
2 1-p 2 1-p (4) 
where p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (where p > O and p i: 1), and C!, and C{3 
denote state s consumption in A and B. Given the existence of asymmetric shocks, there 
is obvious room for risk sharing. To insure risk, agents trade in nominal Arrow-Debreu 
securities. 
Agents cannot consume their own output; to consume, they need to buy goods in 
the marketplace. To give a meaningful role to money, we follow Lucas (1982) and assume 
that money is needed to buy and sell goods. Morever, in each country goods must be paid 
for in the national currency. If countries have separate currencies, they are denoted by $ A 
and $B; if, instead, there is a cornmon currency, it is denoted by a simple $ signo 
At the beginning of each period central banks set the money supply. To increase the 
money supply relative to the previous period, they distribute extra cash to the population; 
consumption would be compensated by an increase in exports, and in B the rise in consumption would be 
resolved through an increase in imports, leaving demand (and supply) unchanged in both countries. 
2 We will later discuss different forms of asymmetries between countries. 
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to decrease the money supply, they confiscate part of the cash holdings. By setting the 
money supply, central banks are able to determine the price leveJ.3 For instance, if central 
bank A creates a money supply M A , then applying the quantity equation of money gives 
us a price level of *,$A.4 
We assume away intertemporal trade in goods and assets. This seems reasonable: 
since goods are non-storable and since in each period countries are ex ante identical, agents 
only trade in Arrow-Debreu securities to insure against risk within perlods. Moreover, 
since all perlods are identical, it will suffice to focus on one period to solve our infinite 
horizon problem. Note that introducing a more explicit intertemporal structure through, 
for instance, interest-bearing bonds, would further complicate the model without changing 
any of the relevant results. 
There is a cost attached to inflation. For our conclusions to hold, it is essential 
that inflation decreases welfarej it is irrelevant, however, why this is so. One possibility is 
to introduce menu costs. Following Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), we take menu costs to 
be increasing in the rate of inflation. We furthermore assume that the cost of adjusting 
prices is proportional to output. To be more concrete, in country A an inflation rate 7I"A 
leads to a welfare cost equivalent to a decrease in output by: 
(5) 
where 'Y E [O, l]j the greater 'Y, the bigger the cost of inflation. 
Rather than focusing on menu costs,· we could alternatively assume that inflation 
reduces welfare through inefficient government spending. More specifically, if central banks 
use the printing press to buy up part of their country's output, and if this leads to inef-
ficiencies, there will be a welfare loss. Since central banks actually need inflation to be 
welfare decreasing if they want to manipulate the relative price of securities, we can think 
of these inefficiencies as being more of a decision than an undesirable side-effect. If so, we 
could simply assume that central banks throw away a fraction 'Y of the goods they buy. 
3We assume away interest-bearing bonds and currency trading, so tbat agents are willing to bold all tbe 
money tbey receive. 
4We assume a velocity of money of 1, since time periods do not bave an explicit duration. 
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To see how this would work, consider the case of central bank A. Normalize the 
price level of the previous period to l$A. In the absence of inflation, central bank A prints 
QA$A units of money, which it hands out to the population. To create inflation of lI'A, it 
prints an additionalll'AQA$A units of money, which it uses to buy l!;A QA of the country's 
goods. Assuming a fraction 'Y of those goo~ is thrown away, inflation lI'A leads to a loss 
equivalent to a drop in output by 'Y l~;A QA. For small enough levels of inflation this output 
loss can be approximated by 'YlI'AQA, an expression identical to the loss due to menu costs 
in (5). 
The goal of this paper is to analyze optimal policy rules under different monetary 
arrangements. Before entering into details, we must be more specific about the timing of 
events. At the beginning of time central banks announce a monetary policy - and thus an 
inflation rate - for each of the two states of nature. Monetary policy rules are credible,5 
and hold for all periods. Once these policy rules have been announced, time starts running. 
Each period consists of an identical sequence of events: 
1. Agents from both countries meet to buy and sell nominal Arrow-Debreu securities 
referring to the given periodo These securities are simply exchanged; no money is 
used in these transactions. 
2. The state of nature is revealed. Central banks adjust the money supply, with the 
goal of setting inflation consistent with the policy they committed too 
3. Arrow-Debreu securities are redeemed for money. 
4. All money is spent, and agents consume. 
In the non-cooperative case, each central bank maximizes the welfare of its repre-
sentative agent when setting inflation. The optimal policy rules will be given by the Nash 
equilibrium of the non-cooperative game between both central banks. In spite of maximiz-
'It is well known that poliey rules may be dynamica1ly inconsistent, if the benefit from deviating is 
greater than the costo Sinee this is not the main foeus of our paper, we abstract from these issues of 
eredibility and commitment. 
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ing domestic welfare, central banks may set policy rules that deviate from price stability 
in an attempt to improve the terms of trade of securities. 
This possibility of tinkering with the relative prices of securities is· based on two 
crucial assumptions: central banks announce monetary policy before agents trade in secu-
rity markets; and inflation is welfare decreasing. The first assumption allows central banks 
to affect outcomes in security markets. The second assumption gives them a means of 
doing so: by creating inflation when their country receives a positive shock, they reduce 
welfare in good states, lowering the supply of securities, and thus pushing up their price. 
While there exists a certain consensus that inflation is costly, it may seem somewhat ar-
bitrary to assume that policy rules are announced before security markets open. In fact, 
this assumption is less restrictive than it seems. For our results to hold, security markets 
need not be closed before policy is announced; the only thing we require is that there is 
sorne residual uncertainty which has not been traded away at the time policy is set.6 
Since both central banks try to improve their terms of trade in securities, the non-
cooperative out come generally reduces welfare, compared to a situation where both central 
banks commit to price stability. This leads us to consider monetary cooperation, where 
policy is decided through a bargaining process. This cooperation may take place between 
separate central banks, or through the formation of a monetary union. 
3 Optimal monetary policy in the absence of cooperation 
In this section we focus on the case where countries use separate currencies, managed by 
separate central banks that do not cooperate. We solve the model backwards. First the 
security markets equilibrium is determined, taking monetary policy in both countries as 
given. This information is then used by each central bank to choose the monetary policy 
that maximizes domestic welfare,' taking the policy of the other central bank as given. The 
equilibrium of the model is defined as the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game 
between both central banks. 
We start by looking at the optimization problem of country A's representative 
6See Celentani et al. (2002) for a further discussion of this point. 
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agent.7 Given the absence ofintertemporal issues, we focus on one period, and we normalize 
the price level in the previous period to l$A. Let x~ be country A's purchase - or sale, 
if x~ is a negative number - of nominal Arrow-Debreu securities in state of nature s. If 
country A buys x nominal securities, it receives x units of country B's currency when the 
securities are redeemed; if, on the other hand, A sells x nominal Arrow-Debreu securities, it 
pays x units of its own currency when the securities are redeemed. How many consumption 
goods can be bought with the proceeds of these securities depends on the price leve!. For 
instance, if country A receives x units of B's currency, it can acquire 1:"B goods from B. 
Put differently, a purchase of x nominal securities (claims on x units of B's currency) is 
equivalent to a purchase of 1:"B real securities (claims on J+~B consumption goods from 
B). 
When writing down country A's optimization problem, we can save on notation in 
two ways. First, note that in state s = 1 country A is a supplier of securities, whereas in 
state s = 2 it is a demander. This implies that in state s = 1 securities are denominated 
in A's currency (and thus deflated by the price level in A); whereas in state s = 2 they 
are denominated in B's currency (and deflated by the price level in B). Second, note that 
the incentive to create inflation only exists when a country experiences a positive shock. 
Indeed, creating inflation when hit by a negative shock does not make sense, because it 
worsens the country's terms of trade in securities. For instance, if central bank A creates 
inflation when A experiences a negative shock, it pushes up the demand (and thus the price) 
for securities in that state. Since A is a demander of those securities, welfare decreases. 
This implies that in state s = 1 only central bank A may have an incentive to create 
inflation, whereas in state s = 2 only central bank B may wish to do so. 
The maximization problem of country A's representative agent can thus be written 
7To simplify, we will often refer to the "representative agent of country A " as "country A". 
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as: 
1 «1 + Q)(1 - fll"t) + l:~A )l-p 1 (1 - Q + S!» )l-p 
______________ ~~~1 ___ + 2 
2 l-p 2 l-p (6) 
xt xf 
--+p--=O 
1 + 7rt 1 + 7rf s.t. 
where p is the price of real securities in state s = 2 relative to the price of real securities in 
state s = 1. In other words, p represents the number.of consumption goods A gives to B 
in state s = 1, in return for each consumption good A receives from B in state s = 2. We 
therefore refer to p as country B's terms of trade in real securities (and to l/p as country 
A's terms of trade in real securities). 
One may have found it more natural to talk about the relative price of nominal 
- rather than real - securities in the constraint of maximization problem (6); after all, 
claims are eventually redeemed for money. However, since agents know the level of future 
infiation in each state of nature, agents also know the real value of any nominal security, 
so that there is no problem in writing the constraint in (6) in terms of real securities. This 
approach has the advantage of allowing us to interpret the relative price of real securities as 
the terms of trade, a concept which will come in handy once we analyze optimal monetary 
policy. In the same way, country B's maximization problem can be written as: 
maxUB 
xf,xr 
s.t. 
1 (1 - Q + l:!t )l-p 1 «1 + Q)(1 - r7rf) + 1:!, )l-p 
- + 2 l-p 2 l-p 
xB xB 
__ 1 _ + p_2_ = O 
1 + 7rt 1 + 7rf 
Finally, the market clearing conditions require that: 
for s = {1, 2} 
(7) 
(8) 
Solving both maximization problems (6) and (7), and taking into account the mar-
ket clearing conditions (8), give us the equilibrium quantities of real securities demanded 
and supplied: 
xt( 7rt, 7rf ,fi) 
1 +7rt 
...Jl,::.l [(1 - Q)p - (1 + Q)(1 - r7rt)P p 1 
...Jl,::.l 
p p + 1 
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(9) 
xf (7r1 , 7rf, P) 
1 +7rf 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
Again, there is no problem in considering the equilibrium quantities of real - rather than 
nominal - securities. Although we are assuming securities to be nominal, agents know 
their real value, because they know future contingent inflation. Note that the equilibrium 
price pin (9)-(12) is itself a function of 7r1 and 7rf: 
p = ((1 + a)(1 - ')'7r1) + (1 - a))p 
(1 + a)(1 - ')'7rf) + (1 - a) (13) 
Substituting (13) into (9)-(12) therefore allows liS to write the equilibrium quantities ofrea! 
securities in function of the inflation rates: xt(7rt ,7r!) x1 (7rt ,"!l xP(7rt,,,!) and x!("t,,,!) l+,..t ' l+,,~ , l+"t' l+"~ 
Each central bank now chooses the monetary policy that maximizes domestic wel-
fare, taking as given the equilibrium quantities and prices (9)-(13), as well as the monetary 
policy of the other central bank. This gives us the following two maximization problems: 
and 
s.t. 
maxWB 
,,!j 
s.t. 
~A( A B) ~A( A B) ((1 + a)(1 - "'7rA) + ")"1 ''''2 )l-p (1 _ a + X:;,,) ,"2 )l-p 1 I 1 l+"t 1 l+,,~ 
. + - ----::-----''----2 l-p 2 l-p 
(14) 
~B( A B) ~B( A B) (1 - a + "),,.) '''2 )l-p ((1 + a)(1 _ 7rB) + "2"') '''2 )l-p 1 l+"t 1 2 l+"~ ----------~-----+-----------~------~-----2 l-p 2 l-p 
O~7rf~1 (15) 
Note that we are restricting inflation to be weakly positive.8 Moreover, if central banks 
create inflation to buy up part of domestic output, they can of course not buy more than 
RIf we assume menu costs, it is straightforward to allow for welfare decreasing deflation. In that case, 
the incentive on the part of central banks to create inflation becomes more generally an incentive to create 
monetary instability. 
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what their country produces, so that inflation must be smaller than 1.9 The first order 
conditions to problems (14) and (15) give the reaction functions of the central banks. The 
intersection of both reaction functions defines the Nash equilíbrium of this game, and gives 
us the equilibrium inflation rates. 
Before entering into further analytical details, note that monetary policy (inflation) 
affects the demand and the supply - and thus the price - of securities. Central banks can 
therefore 'use' monetary policy to improve the terms of trade of securities. For instance, 
if country A experiences a positive shock, its central bank may have an incentive to create 
inflation: although the direct effect is a drop in domestic consumption, the indirect effect 
is that the lower consumption reduces the supply of real securities, thus pushing up their 
relative price. In other words, by creating inflation, the central bank reduces the magnitude 
of the positive shock, making agents in A less willing to supply claims on their (now smaller) 
production. This leads to an increase in the relative price of those securities. 
If this indirect (positive) effect - an improvement in the terms of trade - domi-
nates the direct (negative) effect - a drop in consumption -, central bank A optimally 
chooses to create inflation. Of course, if the other country behaves in a similar way when-
ever it is hit by a positive shock, the effect on the relative price of real securities will wash 
out, and we get a suboptimal outcome: both countries suffer the welfare losses of inflation, 
and neither benefits from an improvement in the terms of trade of its securities. 
The following proposition gives the optimallevels of inflation when a country ex-
periences a positive shock. 
Proposition 1. JI countries are perlectly symmetric, the non-cooperative Nash equüibrium 
corresponding to the solution to (14) and (15) gives the lollowing levels 01 inftation: 
i/op> 2 
else 
(16) 
9In reality, a central bank is neverable to buy up all of the country's production as long as the population 
holds part of the money supply and inflation is finite. As discussed befare, for an inflation of 11" a central bank 
can buy a proportion 11"/(1 + 11") of the country's output. In spite of this, we still need to restrict inflation 
to be smaller than 1 in optimization problems (14) and (15) because we are approximating 11"/(1 + 11") by 
11". Although this linear approximation is only reasonable for small values of inflation, we stick with it far 
reasons of algebraic simplicity and to keep the expression equivalent to that of menu costs. 
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and 
~B { 11"2 = 
Proof. See Appendix A.l. 
20<p-4 if ap > 2 
else 
(17) 
In other words, in order for the positive terms of trade effect to compensate the negative 
welfare effect from inflation, the coefficient of relative risk aversion p andj or the size of the 
supply shock a need to be sufficiently large. 
This makes sense. The stronger risk aversion, the greater the positive effect on the 
terms of trade: if risk aversion is high, the demand for securities is relatively inelastic, so 
that the drop in supply has a large positive effect on the terms of trade of the country 
creating inflation. As for the supply shock, if its size is small, the scope for using inflation 
is limited. As we have argued, the welfare cost of inflation is equivalent to a reduction in 
output. Therefore, if the positive supply shock is small, the country cannot afford to have 
output drop too much; this limits the optimal level of inflation. 
Whether the condition for positive inflation - i.e., ap > 2 - is empirically relevant 
depends essentially on whether we are willing to accept a relatively high level of relative 
risk aversion: for instance, p = 40 and a = 0.05 will do the jobj so will p = 20 and 
a = 0.1. Though such high degrees of risk aversion may seem unacceptable, they 'should 
not necessarily be ruled out. lO In any event, the goal of this paper is limited to pointing 
out a novel mechanismj to get a feel of whether this mechanism is empirically relevant, 
surely a more complete model of the economy would be needed. 
Proposition 2 provides further insights into the optimallevel of inflation by consid-
ering the following comparative statics results: 
Proposition 2. 1f countries are perfectly symmetric and if ap > 2, fhen fhe following 
compamtive statics results hold for fhe optimallevel of inftation in country A and B: 
10 Although Mehra and Prescott (1985) consider a p of 10 to be the maximum acceptable level, Kandel 
and Stambaugh (1991) argue that a p as high as 30 should not be ruled out as unrealistic. Moreover, it is 
well known that much higher values of p are needed to explain the equity premium puzzle: as pointed out 
by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), the equity premium far postwar data requires a p of 100. 
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1 ~ - (1+"')(4(I-",~ > O d ~ = (I+"')~4(I-",V > O 
. Bp - «1+"')'y(p-2) an Bp «1+'" (p-2)) 
2 ~ - (p-2) (2e+4) O d !!i! tp-2~~+4~ O 
. B", - «1+",h(p-2W > an a.. = ( 1+'" 2)2 > 
Proof. Left to the reader. 
These results are related to what we said before. On the one hand, as the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion increases, the demand for securities becomes more inelastic, thus 
strengthening the incentive to raise inflation. On the other hand, the smaller the supply 
shock, the smaller the scope to use inflation to affect security prices. 
The following proposition summarizes what happens to risk sharing and' welfare 
when the optimallevel of inflation is positive: 
Proposition 3. JI countries are perlectly symmetric and ap > 2 then: 
1. Compared to a situation 01 price stability, the equilibrium relative price 01 real secu-
rities p remains unchanged at 1. 
2. Although risk sharing is complete, it is not efficient: wellare in both countries is lower 
compared to a situation 01 price stability. 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
These results are intuitive. If countries are perfectly symmetric, their attempts at using 
inflation to improve the terms of trade of their securities fail, as they cancel each other out 
completely. Moreover, since in each state of nature one of the two countries creates inflation, 
and since that level of inflation is identical, aggregate production net of the losses from 
inflation remains constant across states of nature. This implies that risk sharing continues 
to be complete: each country fully smooths consumption. However, risk sharing ceases to 
be efficient: creating inflation is equivalent to cutting back production. This makes both 
countries worse off compared to a situation of price stability, as both suffer the negative 
welfare effects of inflation, while neither benefits from an improvement in their terms of 
trade. 
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Before talking about the need for monetary cooperation, we briefiy discuss if and 
how our results change when we move away from our perfectly symmetric setup. There 
are of course many forms of asymmetries we might want to consider; we will focus on 
differences in country size. ll More specifically, assume the population of A increases to 
(1 + lT), without affecting per capita output, so that the representative agent in A still 
produces (1 + o) if s = 1, and (1 - o) if s = 2.12 The maximization problems of the 
representative agents of A and B - expressions (6) and (7) - are therefore unchanged. 
The market clearing condition (8), however, now looks different as a consequence of A's 
greater population: 
X~ = -(1 + lT)x: for s = {1,2} 
This, in turn, affects the expression of the equilibrium price of securities (13): 
fi = «1 + 0)(1 + lT)(l - 1'7rt) + (1 - o))p 
(1 + 0)(1 - 1'7rf) + (1 - 0)(1 + lT) 
(18) 
(19) 
To see what happens when the size of A increases, we use a numerical example. As 
parameter values, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion p equal to 25; we choase a 
supply shock o of 0.1; and we set l' = 0.5.13 Fig. 1 and 2 plot the equilibrium infiation 
rates for countries A (when s = 1) and B (when s = 2) in function of 1 + lT. The basic 
mechanism continues to apply: to improve the terms of trade of their securities, central 
banks may have an incentive to create infiation whenever their country is faced with a 
positive shock. However, as soon as we introduce size asymmetries, the optimallevel of 
infiation starts to differ across countries. More particularly, the greater the size of A, the 
higher infiation in A, and the lower infiation in B. The intuition is the following. Because 
11 Other types of asyrnrnetries, such as differences in the probabilities of receiving a positive shock, are 
discussed in Appendix B. 
12 Note that this setup introduces aggregate uncertainty: when the larger country receives the positive 
shock (in state 1) aggregate output is greater than when the srnaJler country gets the positive shock (in state 
2). Appendix B.2 discusses size asyrnrnetries between countries that do not lead to aggregate uncertainty. 
JaIf the cost of inflation takes the forrn of inefficient governrnent spending, 'Y = 0.5 corresponds to the 
governrnent throwing away haJf of what it buys (and redistributing the rest back to the population). If the 
cost of inflation takes the forrn of rnenu costs, we would probably want a lower vaJue of 'Y. That sirnply 
increa.ses the optirnaJ inflation rateo dividing 'Y by x corresponds to rnultiplying the optirnaJ inflation rate 
by x. 
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of its greater size, A finds it easier to manipulate its terms of trade: a given increase in 
inflation in A has a larger effect on relative prices than a same increase in inflation in B. In 
other words, for a same marginal cost in terms of output per capita, the marginal benefit 
of inflation is bigger in the larger country, so that in equilibrium the larger country distorts 
more. 
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Fig. 1: Inflation in A. 
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Fig. 4: Welfare in A. 
Fig. 1 through 4: Asymmetries in country size (1 + (T is the relative size of A). 
Although inflation in A and B continue to have compensating effects on the relative 
price of securities, they cease to cancel out completely. Because A now has a greater 
distortive capacity than B, its terms of trade actually improve as the country grows in 
size. Fig. 3 illustrates this point by plotting p in the non-cooperative outcome, relative to 
p in the absence of distortions: a ratio below 1 indicates an improvement in A's terms of 
trade. Since A experiences an increase in its terms of trade as the country grows in size, 
it is not clear anymore that it becomes worse off compared to the benchmark case of price 
stability. If the gains from the improvement in the terms of trade more than compensate the 
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losses from inflation, A may actually become better off. Fig. 4 confirms this argument by 
plotting the change in A's welfare when moving from price stability to the non-cooperative 
Nash solution: when A becomes sufficiently large, its welfare improves. This suggests that 
large countries may be less keen on monetary cooperation. 
The result that larger countries distort more will be mitigated - or even disappear 
- jf we incorporate the stylized fact that larger countries experience proportionally smaller 
shocks (Head, 1995). Although it is easier for a larger country to distort prices, the smaller 
shocks give it less scope to do so. Appendix B.2 discusses this point in further detaiJ. 
4 Monetary Cooperation 
As stated in Proposition 2, a system with two separate central banks setting monetary 
policy in a non-cooperative manner leads to a suboptimal outcome jf countries are perfectly 
symmetric: positive inflation decreases welfare in both countries, without improving their 
terms of trade. In this section we will show that monetary cooperation brings us back to 
the optimal solution. 
Cooperation can take on different forms: separate central banks may continue to 
exist, with the difference that they now (explicitly or implicitly) coordinate their monetary 
policiesj or a common central bank may emerge that sets a common monetary policy for 
both regions. Which form of cooperation is implemented may have to do with enforcement 
issues. As is well known, in a repeated game setting cooperation can be sustained without 
the need for an institutional framework, as long as the punishment for deviating is suffi-
ciently harsh. However, if for whatever reason such an arrangement is not possible, formal 
cooperation, or even a monetary union, may well be the answer. 
We start by looking at the case of monetary cooperation between separate central 
banksj we willlatersay something more about monetary unions. By cooperation we mean 
that each country's monetary policy is now the outcome of a bargaining process between 
both central banks. Following the axioma tic bargaining approach, we impose individual 
rationality: any outcome must be welfare-improving for both countries, compared to the 
non-cooperative solution. If not, countries would have no interest in cooperating. For the 
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case oí Nash bargaining, the outcome will be monetary stability: 
Proposition 4. JI countries are perlectly symmetric, the solution to the Nash bargaining 
process between both central banks prescribes zero inflation in both states 01 nature. 
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
The intuition is straightíorward. Given the perfectly symmetric setup, the solution must 
also be períectly symmetric: in other words, it must satisfy the condition *t = *f. 
Following (13), this implies that the relative price oí securities remains unchanged (and 
equal to 1), independently oí the level oí inflation. G iven that neither country benefits from 
an improvement in its terms oí trade, it íollows that the unique Pareto optimal solution is 
to have zero inflation in both states oí natute. 
We now turn to the case oí a monetary union, where representatives from both 
countries decide on a common monetary policy through bargaining. The difference with 
simple cooperation is that inflation is now set at the level oí the union. How union-wide 
inflation affects welíare in both countries depends on how we interpret the cost oí inflation. 
In the case oí menu costs, the effect oí inflation is equivalent to a proportional drop in 
output in both countries by "{7r. In the case oí the central bank throwing away pan oí 
output, the overallloss will still be a proportional decrease in aggregate output by "{7r, but 
the central bank can now choose how to divide that loss between both countries. 14 Either 
way, the Nash bargaining solution in a monetary union also leads to price stability: 
Proposition 5. JI countries are perlectly symmetric, the solution to the Nash bargaining 
process between representatives 01 both countries in a monetary union gives 'US zero inflation 
in both states 01 nature. 
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
To see this, it suffices to show that no matter how the cost oí inflation is divided between 
countries, the relative price of securities remains equal to 1. The rest of the argument 
14 Depending on where the central bank decides to buy up output, it also decides how it aBocates the cost 
of in/lation. 
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is identical to that of Proposition 4: since once again neither country benefits from an 
improvement in its terms of trade, the Pareto optimal salution is zero inflation. 
We now discuss how our problem changes when we deviate from perfect symmetry. 
We again start by focusing on the case of monetary cooperation between central banks. 
Even though analytically solving for the Nash bargaining solution is too complex, we can 
show that monetary cooperation will generally lead to a Pareto superior outcome: 
Proposition 6. Jf countries are asymmetric and if in the non-coopemtive equilibrium 
inftation is strictly positive in both countries 0t > O and i~ > O), moneta7"y coopemtion 
between centml banks allows for a Pareto superior outcome. 
Proof. See Appendix A.5. 
Again, this result is quite easy to understand. Assume the non-cooperative outcome leads 
to strictly positive inflation whenever a country receives a positive shock: it > O and 
i~ > O. Following expression (19), these inflation rates give us a relative price of real 
securitles in the non-cooperative game equal to p. Since both it and i~ are strictly 
positive, it is clear that we can obtain the same relative price p for lower values of inflation 
*1 and *~, so that welfare improves in both countries. In other words, cooperation can 
lead to an outcome which is Pareto superior to the non-cooperative solution. 
Looking at our numerical example of asymmetric country sizes, Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 
show that optimal inflation remains strictly positive in both countries as long as A does 
not become too big, so that according to Proposition 6 it pays off to cooperate. However, if 
A continues to grow in size, optimal inflation in B goes to zero, but remains positive in A. 
This causes the argument in our proof to break down: we cannot anymore lower inflation 
in both countries, while leaving the relative price of securities unchanged, because inflation 
in the smaller country is already zero. Under those circumstances it is not clear whether 
the larger country would still have an interest in cooperating through simple bargaining. 
Of course this picture would change if we allowed for non-distortionary side payments. 
In that case monetary stability would always be optimal, since it maximizes aggregate 
consumption. It would then suffice to bargain over the size of non-distortionary transfers 
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to ensure that both parties gain. 
Before concluding, we analyze the case of a monetary union when we deviate from 
perfect symmetry. If the cost of inftation takes the form of the central bank throwing 
away part of output, all results go through. If, on the contrary, we prefer the menu cost 
interpretation, this is not obvious anymore. In a monetary union, menu costs benefit from 
one less degree of freedom, because the common central bank loses the capacity to allocate 
the cost of union-wide inftation between the two countries. The following proposition 
therefore only refers to the interpretation of the central bank throwing output away: 
Proposition 7. Jf countries are asymmetric and if in the non-cooperative equilibrium 
inflation is strictly positive in both countries (1r~ > O and:;rf > O), a monetary union 
allows for a Pareto superior outcome, as long as the central bank can decide how to allocate 
the cost of inflation between countries. 
Proof. See Appendix A.6. 
The proof essentially shows that the Pareto superior solution of Proposition 6 can be 
replicated for the case of a monetary union. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
If countries are subject to asymmetric shocks, the absence of monetary cooperation may 
lead to a suboptimal outcome. This happens even if central banks can commit in advance 
to the monetary policy that maximizes social welfare. The reason is that central banks 
may want to use inftation to affect the terms oftrade in the risk sharing market. However, 
given that both central banks have the same incentive, the terms of trade effect washes 
out, and both countries end up worse off. To get rid of this externality problem, some 
form of monetary cooperation is necessary: if cooperation between separate central banks 
is difficult, forming a monetary union may be the way out. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom of Mundell (1961), this paper therefore makes 
a case for countries facing asymmetric shocks ~o adopt a common currency. By doing so, 
it revives the Mundell (1973) argument in favor of monetary unions. Note that by giving 
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central banks the capacity to commit, we are biasing our results against Mundell (1973). 
Even so, the "latter Mundell" proves to be alive and well. 
One last comment: in our model optimal monetary policy prescribes creating in-
flation in booms and keeping prices stable in recessions. While this fits the empirical 
regularity ofpro-cyclical inflation, it goes against the the standard textbook recommenda-
tion of contractionary monetary policy during booms and expansionary monetary policy 
during recessions. This discrepancy is not surprising. To isolate the specific mechanism 
of interest, we switched off any other link between inflation and output. In a more fully 
specified model our policy recommendation could thus be rephrased as making monetary 
policy less contractionary during booms and less expansionary during recessions, compared 
to standard practice. 
A Proofs of Propositions 
A.l Proof of Proposition 1 
The equilibrium is defined as a solution to (14) and (15), i.e., a combination of monetary 
policies (1i't, 1i'f), from which neither central bank has an incentive to deviate. Since the 
problem is perfectly symmetric, any solution must satisfy 1i't = 1i'f. Interior solutions 
are characterized by the following first order and second order conditions: z: = O, 
1 
g(",1p < O, z; = O, and ~",l~ < O. Comer solutions can arise in two cases( on the 
one hand, monetary policies (1i't, 1i'f) = (O, O) constitute an equilibrium if at that point 
8,,~: < O and 8;:: < O; and on the other hand, monetary policies (1i't, 1i'f) = (1,1) form 
""1 2 
an equilibrium if at that point 0;:; > O and a;:¡ > O. We now distinguish between the 
following cases: 
1. Case 1: Ot.p ~ 2. 
As a preliminary remark, note that since Ot. ~ 1, this condition implies that p > 2. 
The first order condition of maximization problem (14) of central bank A is: 
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Solving out for 7ft gives us: 
~A 
7f1 
20.p - 4 (21) (1 + o.)-y(p - 2) 
Note that this solution is within the acceptable range: O ~ 7ft ~ 1. To check whether 
(21) corresponds to a local maximum, we check the second order condition: 
Given that p > 2, the second order condition is negative, so that we are indeed in pres-
f 1 al . Th t l" (~A ~B) _ (2ap-4 2ao 4 ) ence o a oc m8.Xlmum. e mone ary po ICles 7f1, 7f2 - (1+ah(p-2)' (1+ah(p-2) 
therefore satisfy the equilibrium conditions. It can easily be checked that there are 
no corner solutions. 
2. Case 2: o.p < 2 and p > 2. 
Taking the first order condition of maximization problem (14), and solving out for 7ft 
gives us the same expression as in (21). Note, however, that in this case 7ft < O, so 
that the solution is outside the acceptable range. This leaves us with possible corner 
solutions. For monetary policies (7ft, 7ff) = (O, O) we have: 
awA __ p-2 4-20.p 
a A - 2 (1 + 0.)')' 21+ < O 7f1 P 
(23) 
By symmetry, aaW: < O, so that monetary policies (7ft, 7ff) = (O, O) constitute an 
"2 
equilibrium. It can easily be checked that there do not exist other corner solutions. 
3. Case 3: o.p < 2 and p ~ 2. 
Again, the first order condition of maximization problem (14) is given by (20). It 
is clear that the corresponding value 7ft is outside the allowed range: if p = 2, 7ft 
would be minus infinity; if p < 2, 7ft = (l+~ah(P~2)' which is greater than 1. This 
again leaves us with possible corner solutions. By analogy with Case 2, it can easily 
be shown that monetary policies (7ft, 7ff) = (O, O) constitute an equilibrium, and 
that there are no other corner solutions .• 
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3 
1. Given the problem is perfectly symmetric, we know that 1ft = 1ff, so that according 
to (13) the equilibrium price ji = 1. 
2. In state 8 = 1 aggregate production (of both regions together) net of inflation is 
(1 + a)(l - ')'1ft) + (1 - a); similarly, in state 8 = 2 aggregate production net of 
inflation is (1 - a) + (1 + a)(l - ')'1ff). Since 1ft = 1ff, aggregate production net of 
inflation is constant across states. This implies complete risk sharing; in each country 
consumption is fuily smoothed across states. Given that countries are completely 
symmetric, each country will consume exactly half of aggregate production net of 
inflation. Since ap > 2, inflation is strictly positive, so that consumption wiil be 
lower compared to the case of price stability. I 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4 
The Nash bargaining solution maximizes 
(24) 
with respect to 7rt and 7rf, where íJA and íJB refer to the utilities of the non-cooperative 
Nash equilibrium. Given complete symmetry, the two first order conditions corresponding 
to the aboye maximization problem will also be completely symmetric, so that the equi-
librium levels of inflation corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution will be identical: 
7if = *f· This implies that the equilibrium relative price of securities wiil always be equal 
to 1, independently of the level of inflation. Since inflation does not affect the relative 
price of securities, the maximization problem boils down to maximizing production net of 
inflation. Not surprisingly, this implies setting inflation equal to zero in both countries: 
*t = *f = O. I 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5 
If the welfare 1088 from inflation is due to throwing away part of output, in a monetary 
union the central bank can decide how to divide that cost between both countries. Of the 
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total loss in output 2')'1T, it allocates a share 6 to the country experiencing the positive 
shock, and a share 1 - 6 to the other. (Given the perfectly symmetric setup, 6 does not 
depend on which region gets the positive shock.) Defining 'YI = I~Q and 'Y2 = 2:=!, we 
can re-write optimization problems (6) and (7) in the following manner: 
maxUA 
xt,X~ 
1 ((1 + 0)(1 - 'Y11I"1) + ~ )I-p 1 ((1 - 0)(1 - 'Y211"2) + ~ )I-P 
"2 1 - P + 2 1 _ P (25) 
and 
s.t. 
maxUB 
xf,xf 
s.t. 
xA xA 
__ 1 _ + p __ 2 _ = O 
1 + 11"1 1 + 11"2 
Solving these maximization problems, while taking into account the market clearing con-
ditions (8), gives us the equilibrium price level: 
p = ((1 + 0){1 - 'Y11I"1) + (1 - 0){1 - 'Y211"1»p 
(1 + 0){1 - 'Y11I"2) + (1 - 0)(1 - 'Y211"2) (27) 
The value that 6 takes (and, therefore, also the values that 'YI and 'Y2 take) does not change 
the perfectly symmetric nature of the problem. Following the argument in Proposition 4, 
the equilibrium levels of inflation must therefore be identical: 1i"¡ = *2, This implies that 
p will be equal to 1, independently of the values of 6, 'YI and 'Y2' The rest of the proof 
follows by analogy with Proposition 4. Showing the same result if we focus on menu costs 
is even easier, since in that case 'YI = 'Y2 = 'Y .• 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6 
We prove the proposition for the case of asymmetries in country sizesi other types of 
asymmetries can be dealt with in an analogous manner. Following the notation of Section 
3, (19) gives the equilibrium price of the non-cooperative equilibrium: 
p= ((1 + 0)(1 + 0")(1 - 'Y1I"f) + (1 - o»P 
(1 + 0)(1 - 'Y1I"f) + (1 - 0)(1 + 0") 
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(28) 
where :rrt > o and :rrf > O. In that case it is obvious that we can lower infiation in both 
countries to *f <:rrt and *Ij < :rrf, while maintaining the value of the relative price (28). 
If infiation is lower in both countries, and the relative price of securities is unchanged, 
welfare in both countries has increased .• 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7 
The starting point (the non-cooperative solution) is equal to that in Proposition 6. It is 
easy to show that the Pareto superior outcome in Proposition 6 can be replicated in the 
framework of a monetary union. Using the same notation as in Proposition 5, it suffices to 
-A -B 
set {¡ = 1, 1I"i = ~ and 11"2 = ~, where 1I"i and 11"2 refer to the union-wide infiation rates in 
state 1 and state 2, and *f and *Ij refer to the infiation rates under monetary cooperation 
in Proposition 6 .• 
B Different types of asymmetries 
B.l Different probabilities of positive shocks across countries 
In this section we assume that state 1 happens with probability q and state 2 with prob-
ability 1 - q. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 plot the equilibrium infiation rates for countries A (when 
s = 1) and B (when s = 2) in function of q. As can be seen, the lower the probability of 
getting a positive shock, the higher the optimal infiation rateo The intuition is the follow-
ing. Infiation leads to a drop in output whenever the country experiences a positive shock. 
Therefore, the lower the probability of receivirig a positive shock, the lower the expected 
cost of infiation, and the higher the optimal infiation rateo The different infiation rates 
in A and B leads to uncertainty in aggregate output net of infiation losses, so that risk 
sharing becomes incomplete: as soon as we deviate from q = 1/2, there is less-than-full 
consumption smoothing in each country. 
Moreover, the asymmetry implies that the terms of trade of one of the two countries 
may improve. Fig. 7 illustrates this point: it plots p in the non-cooperative outcome, 
relative to p in the absence of distortions. If the ratio in Fig. 7 rises aboye 1, B's terms of 
trade in securities improve; if the ratio drops below 1, A's terms of trade improve. Fig. 7 
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shows an improvement in A's terms of trade as q drops below 1/2. This is consistent with 
our findings in Fig. 5 and 6: for q below 1/2, inflation is higher in A than in B, so that 
the distortive capacity of A is greater than that of B. 
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Fig. 5: Inflation in A. 
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Fig. 7: Relative price security 2. 
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Fig. 6: Inflation in B. 
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Fig. 8: Welfare in A. 
Fig. 5 through 8: Asymmetry in the probability of receiving a positive shock. 
Since the terms of trade of one of the two countries improves as we move away 
from q = 1/2, that country may become better off compared to the benchmark case of 
price stability. Fig. 8 confirms this argument by plotting the change in A's welfare when 
moving from price stability to the non-coopera ti ve Nash solution: for q low enough, welfare 
improves. This is not surprising. As q drops below 1/2, A's terms of trade improve, whereas 
the cost of inflation faUs. The non-monotone shape of the welfare change has to do with the 
degree of uncertainty: as q approaches O or 1, uncertainty becomes very smaU, so that the 
gains from risk sharing - and the gains from distorting - become negligible. Our results 
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1 q 
1 q 
therefore suggest that the country experiencing positive shocks with a low probability may 
have less to gain from monetary cooperation. 
B.2 Different country sizes and different shock sizes 
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Fig. 9: Inflation A. 
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Fig. 9 through 11: Asymmetries in country size with bigger country receiving smaller 
shock (1 + (f is the size of A and 1 - (f the size of B) 
Rather than considering asymmetric country sizes with identical shocks, as we do 
in the main text, we now take into account the stylized fact that larger countries experience 
proportionally smaller shocks (Read, 1995). More specifically, suppose country A annexes a 
fraction (f of country A's population.15 To keep things simple, assume agents in A continue 
to be homogeneous.16 Per capita output in A is then (1 + :¡:a) if s = 1, and (1- ~¡:a) if 
s = 2. Contrary to the case we studied in the main text, the size of shocks in A therefore 
decrease with country size. 
As shown in Fig. 9 and 10, the incentive to create inflation now also decreases 
15Note that, contrary to the example in the main text, this type of size asymmetry does not introduce 
aggregate uncertainty. See faotnote (12). 
16This is equivalent to assuming complete redistrihution across agents within countries. 
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in the larger country. The intuition is the following: although it is easier for the bigger 
country to distort prices, the smaller shock size gives it less room to do so. Since price 
distortions decrease with size asymmetry, so does the welfare loss due to distortions (Fig. 
11 and 12). 
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